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VAT FRAUD & TRIANGULATION
Richard T. Ainsworth
Missing trader intra-community (MTIC) fraud has received a lot of domestic
enforcement attention.1 True cross border enforcement (joint or coordinated multiMember State audit) has been limited.2 There are signs that this is changing as the
Member States become more aggressive in their search for revenue.3 Domestic rules
designed to prevent losses in neighboring States are being adopted and enforced.4 It
appears that the Commission’s urgings are being heeded.5
1

There are many descriptions of missing trader intra-community fraud (MTIC). Some times it is a simple
linear fraud (acquisition fraud), while at other times the supply (goods or service) circles round -and-round
(carousel fraud), and yet other times there are highly complex pattern of contra-trading where transactions
are structured to disguise trading patterns. David Demack, Tribunal Judge for the UK’s First -Tier Tribunal
(Tax Chamber) recently provided the following description in a contra-trading case:
The basic structure of MTIC fraud takes the following form. A “missing trader”,
i.e. a UK VAT registered trader, or one who uses another’s VAT registration, purchases
goods from abroad and imports them into the UK. The importation bears no VAT. The
trader sells the goods intra UK, charging VAT at the standard rate on the sale to an
intermediary known as a “buffer”. The goods then pass along a chain of purchase and
sale transactions intra UK through a series of other buffers. Each buffer properly charges
and reclaims VAT. The final buffer in the chain then sells the goods to a “broker” – in the
present case the appellant traders were the brokers in most of the chains concerned - who,
as the last link in the chain, sells the goods abroad in a zero -rated transaction and
proceeds to reclaim the input tax he paid to the final buffer. Consistently with his name,
the missing trader then disappears having failed to account for the VAT he charged the
first buffer.
In the more complex form of MTIC trading known as contra-trading, the broker
in the chain of transactions described in the last preceding paragraph himself purchases
goods from abroad of equal value to the goods he sells, and sells them along a second
chain of transactions before a second broker sells the goods abroad. The first broker has a
net liability to VAT of nil, and so declares in his VAT return. (The claim for input tax in
the first chain is cancelled out by the output tax in the second chain). The second broker –
again in this case the appellant traders were the brokers in the chains other than those at
[12] above - who has no apparent connection with the fraudulent VAT loss in the first
chain, then proceeds to claim repayment of the input tax on his purchase.
(Joined appeal) Haroon Younas t/a Micromedia v. Commissioner and Triton Communications Co. UK Ltd.
v. Commissioners, [2012] UKFTT (TC) at ¶¶ 13 & 14 (23 January 2012).
2
Court of Auditors, Special Report No 8/2007 concerning administrative cooperation in the field of value
added tax, together with the Commission’s replies (2008/C 20/01).
3
See: Richard T. Ainsworth, A Perfect Storm in the EU VAT: Kittel, R, and MARC, 66 TAX NOT ES INT ’L.
849 (May 28, 2012) (considering signs of an increased cross -border enforcement effort in the EU VAT).
4
For example, Jochen Meyer-Burow & Ocka Stumm, Recent Developments in German Criminal Law and
their Impact on VAT Compliance, INT . VAT M ONIT OR (May/June 2011) 161, 163 indicate:
With effect from 1 January 2011, Sec. 370(6) of the Abgabenordnung provides that
evasion of VAT payable in one of the other EU Member States can also be prosecuted in
Germany. Prior to that date, prosecution of evasion of foreign VAT was only possible on
the basis of reciprocity, i.e. if evasion of German VAT was a criminal offence in t he
other Member State.
5
The EC Treaty requires mutual enforcement. See Communication from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, concerning the need to
develop a coordinated strategy to improve the fight against fiscal fraud, COM (2006) 254, at 6.
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Along with this shift in enforcement focus, triangulation analysis has moved from
being an interesting aspect of the MTIC fraud structure to the central element in a larger
understanding of how a fraudster thinks and how he carries out his fraud. We are coming
to understand that triangulations are not only the mechanism of how the fraud is carried
out; they are a cloak of invisibility that the fraudster casts upon his fraud to hide it from
the authorities.
This should not come as a surprise. In 2007 the House of Lords heard testimony
that pointed directly at triangular manipulations as the tool that fraudsters would use to
disguise movements of goods in aid of their frauds throughout the EU. The accuracy of
the 2007 forecast is now more than a little apparent.
Germany for example, is currently engaged in a multi-billion euro fraud
investigation involving the triangulation of consumer goods and CO2 certificates. The
Augsburg District Court is overseeing the investigation.6
It is helpful to revisit the House of Lords 2007 warning. That warning uses a
hypothetical transaction involving a French trader (A) selling to a UK middleman (B).
The goods are delivered directly to the middleman’s buyer in Germany (C). The
testimonial was as follows:
What is so important to understand about Reverse Charging (RC) is an
anomaly of the VAT system called "Triangulation" or Article 22(8). [It]
means that goods can actually pass from the Missing Traders in France,
Article 10 of the EC Treaty obliges Member States to take all appropriate measures,
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising from
Community acts, which include administrative cooperation, and that Article 280 obliges
Member States to co-ordinate their actions in order to protect the financial interests of the
Community.
The European Parliament has called on all Member States to remove any legal barriers that would impede
cross-border enforcement. See European Parliament resolution of 4 December 2008 on the European
Court of Auditors’ Special Report No. 8/2007 concerning administrative cooperation in the field of value
added tax (2008/2151(INI)) (2010/C 21 E/03), at ¶33.
Stepping up cooperation between judicial authorities
[The EU Parliament] Calls on Member States to remove legal obstacles in national law
which hamper cross-border prosecution, in particular in cases where the VAT losses
occur in another Member State;
The VIES system is premised on cooperation. See: Council Regulation (EC) No. 1798/2003 of 7 October
2003 on administrative cooperation in the field of value added tax and repealing Regulation (EEC) No.
218/92. In addition, the VIES has been recast to make cooperation an explicit requirement – each Member
State is obligated to protect the revenue of other Member States. Council Regulation (EU) No. 904/2010 of
7 October 2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of value added tax (recast).
O.J. (L-268) 1, at prefatory statements “whereas 4.” Art 7 states (emphasis added):
For the purposes of collecting the tax owed, Member States should cooperate to help
ensure that VAT is correctly assessed. They must therefore not only monitor the correct
application of tax owed in their own territory, but should also provide assistance to other
Member States for ensuring the correct application of tax relating to activity carried out
on their own territory but owed in another Member State.
6
See: Decision of the Investigating Judge, Augsburg (Amtsgericht -Ermittlungsrichter Augsburg) Doc. No.
501 Js 132220/11 T:61 G 3140/12 (document reported, but not publicly available).
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directly to [traders] in Germany. There is no need for the goods to come
to the UK. [T]he UK simply handles the paperwork (invoices) and the
payments. Article 22(8) is a perfectly correct and normal trading system
that will be exploited by those who will come to the UK to mastermind the
fraud in other member states from here. 7
The Augsburg investigation is not only uncovering triangulations that “hide the
goods,” but it is also uncovering sophisticated payment platforms that “hide the money
transfers.” The intent of these structures is to make the fraud fully invisible to the
authorities (goods and funds) until after the trader has disappeared. All twenty-seven
Member States are involved, but most notable is a virtual thicket of triangles involving
Belgian, German, and Austrian companies (with some of the German companies
controlled from the UK and others controlled from Belgium). The payment platforms
(internet banks) are controlled through firms based in Scandinavia.8
The breadth of the German investigation is breathtaking, but with the Mutual
Assistance for the Recovery of Claims (MARC) Directive, in effect as of January 1,
2012,9 this kind of comprehensive multi-jurisdictional MTIC investigation may be
becoming the new norm. If so, triangulations will most certainly be at its core.
This paper focuses on the developing law. It explains triangulation, triangulation
simplification, and then considers several recent court decisions where fraudsters
manipulated the VAT system with triangular trades. The cases illustrate both the
enforcement problems with triangular trades, and highlight how the courts’ examination
of triangular frauds is leading to significant developments in the VAT law. Three cases
are drawn from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),10 and three are from
national courts.11

7

UK Parliament, Select Committee on European Union – Minutes of Evidence (January 22, 2007)
available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ ldselect/ldeucom/101/7022706.htm.
8
Payment platforms are internet banking operations that allow huge fund transfer among members of a
conspiracy undetected by banking regulators. In the Augsburg case these platforms include Swebline AB
(Denmark), Swebline AS (Norway), ZI Enterprises Ltd. (Turkey), Express Office A/B (Sweden), Etrade
Factoring (Denmark), Skan Finans (Sweden), ICI Global OU (UK), Black Eagle Capital Inc. (UK), Base
Trade Financials Ltd. (UK), and ZI Enterprises Teknolojik (Turkey). These platforms had been the subject
of investigative reports in the Danish press. See: John Mynderup, Two Directors Extradited to Germany
(To Direktorer Udleveret til Tyskland), EKST RA BLADET (August 1, 2012) available at:
http://ekstrabladet.dk/kup/dinepenge/article1800848.ece (in Danish); Bo Elkjaer & John Mynderup, Quota
Scammer Snyder Still with VAT: Oops, that 300 million has straight disappeared , (KVOTE SVINDLERE
SNYDER STADIG MED MOMSEN: Hovsa, der forsvandt sgu lige 300 millioner til) EKST RA BLADET
(December 6, 2010); Bo Elkjaer & John Mynderup, Danish Quota Scamers in Luxury in Dubai –
Disclosure: Extensive tax fraud with CO2 quotas controlled by Danish -owned shadow banks (Dansk
kvotesvindler i luksus i Dubai - Afsløring: Omfattende momssvindel med CO2-kvoter styres via danskejede
skygge-banker), EKST RA BLADET (December 6, 2010) available at:
http://ekstrabladet.dk/nyheder/samfund/article1464516.ece (in Danish).
9
Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims
relating to taxes, duties, and other measures, O.J. (L 84) 1 (2010).
10
They are (1) Teleos plc and Others v. Commissioner of Customs and Excise, Case C-409/04 (September
27, 2007); (2) the Joined Cases of Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. X and Facet BV, C-536/08 and C-
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TRIANGULATION
In a basic triangular transaction (A) sells to (B) who re-sells to (C). Two
contracts (invoices and payments) are involved: (A) to (B), and then (B) to (C). The
goods are delivered (A) to (C). Additional intermediate parties are possible (B-1, B-2, B3 etc.) but the critical elements remain the same – the contracts follow the buy/sell chain,
but the goods go directly from the first party (A) to the last party (C).
Triangulation becomes complicated when a supplier’s customer resides in another
Member State. Article 138 of the VAT Directive12 requires suppliers to zero-rate their
supplies of goods (dispatched or transported) to a taxable person in another Member
State. The destination must be outside the supplier’s territory (but within the EU) and the
transport must be to a Member State other than the State where the transport begins.13 A
classic triangulation fact pattern would involve (A) in Member State 1 (Italy) selling to
(B) in Member State 2 (Germany) with the goods delivered directly from (A) to (B’s)
customer (C) in Member State 3 (Austria).
Because there are two successive contracts for the sale of the same goods, and
only one dispatch or transport, the dispatch will be associated with only one of the two
supplies. This supply is zero-rated. The other supply is deemed made either in the
Member State of departure or the Member State of arrival (depending on the facts of the
case).14 Thus, if (A) transports the goods to (C) it is the (A)/(B) transaction that is zerorated, and the (B)/(C) transaction is deemed to occur in Member State 3 (Austria).15
Article 40 indicates that the place of supply for intra-community acquisitions is
the Member State where dispatch of the goods ends. This means (in this example) that

539/08 (April 22, 2010); and (3) Mecsek -Gabona Kft v. Nemzeti Ad - s mhi atal l-dun nt li
Region lis Ad
iga gat s ga, Case C-273/11 (September 6, 2012).
11
The primary case is (1) a First Tier Tribunal decision from the UK, Mexcom Ltd. v. HMRC, [2010]
UKFTT 163 (TC) (December 4, 2009). The others are from the Bundesfinanzhof (German Supreme Tax
Court) are: (2) V R 39/08 of January 26, 2011; (3) XI R 40/08 also of January 26, 2011 and are referenced
infra note 37.
12
VAT Directive 2006/112/EC of November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, O.J. (L 347)
1 (2006) [hereinafter VAT Directive].
13
The location of the customer and the destination of the goods do not need to be in the same member state.
The critical requirement is that the destination must not be in the seller’s Member State. For example if a
UK established business makes a supply to a French established business, it is just as acceptab le for the
goods to be dispatched from the UK to Germany, as it would be for the goods to be dispatched from the
UK to France. Both scenarios would qualify as a zero-rated intra-community supply.
14
EMAG Handel Eder OHG v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten (Berufungssenat II) Case C-245/04
(April 6, 2006).
15
Euro Tyre Holding v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, Case C-430/09 (December 16, 2010). If C
transports the goods, it would be the B/C transaction that would be zero -rated, and the A/C transaction
would be deemed to occur in Member State 1. The most difficult attribution of transportation with a
particular contract arises when B transports the goods under an “ex works” contract with A. In this case B
is associated with both the buy (A/B) and the sell (B/C) transactions. It takes a careful “facts and
circumstances” analysis to determine whether the A/B or the B/C transaction is properly zero -rated.
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(B) must register and account for acquisition VAT in Member State 3. It also means that
(B) makes a domestic supply to (C) in Member State 3.16
But, what if (B) does not register and account for VAT in Member State 3?
Article 41 is designed to provide assurance that (B) will do so. Article 41 states that
acquisition VAT is also due on the same transaction in the Member State that issued
(B’s) VAT ID (the number under which (B’s) intra-community acquisition was made).
This “safety net” provision essentially results in double taxation. However, it does not
apply if (B) has already accounted for VAT in Member State 3.
If the safety net applies, then (B) must account for VAT in Member State 2
(Germany). It may not deduct this amount even if (B) eventually registers and accounts
for VAT in Member State 3 (Austria). The rules indicate that instead of being permitted
to take an immediate deduction for VAT paid on the same return on which the acquisition
is reported, (B) is required to apply for a refund in Member State 2. At this time (B) will
need to supply proof that it has accounted for VAT in Member State 3. Absent this
proof, the transaction will be double taxed.
The intention is to make triangular transactions secure by relying on taxpayer selfinterest. Taxpayers should want to avoid the safety net by accounting for VAT in
Member State 3 in advance of the filing requirements in Member State 2.
SIMPLIFICATION TRIANGULATION
The single market makes the VAT treatment of cross-border triangulations
complex. Recognizing this, when the single market was established (January 1, 1993) a
simplification mechanism was included that would handle (simplify the compliance and
reporting requirements of) the most common triangulation patterns.17 Simplification was
considered necessary because of the volume of commercial activity involving
middlemen. Extremely complex VAT treatment for very common triangulation
transactions would hurt the single market. The critical provisions dealing with this issue
are found at Articles 41,18 42,19 and 141.20
16

If the example is changed so that (C) performs the transport, then the (B)/(C) transaction is zero-rated
(because the transport will be associated with the B/C contract) and B will now register, pay, and account
for VAT in Member State 1. If (B) performs the transport then facts and circumstances will determine
which contract the transport will be associated with.
17
Council Directive 91/680/EEC of 16 December 1991 supplementing the common system of value added
tax and amending Directive 77/388/EEC with a view to the abolition of fiscal frontiers, 1991 O.J. (L 376)
1. Proposals in advance of this change began in earnest in 1985. See Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85) 310 final, 52 available at:
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com1985_0310_f_en.pdf (proposing among other
items, that an origin system be adopted for intra-community sales of goods, that Member States should
allow VAT paid in another Member State to be deductible in t he current Member State, and that modern
information technology be relied upon to settle accounts among the Member States by allocating revenues
from Clearing House). See also Michael van de Leur, Triangulation or Strangulation? INT . VAT M ONITOR
397 (November/December 2010) (discussing the history of the triangulation simplification rules in the
context of the CJEU’s decision in Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. X and Facet BV).
18
VAT Directive, supra note 12, or Article 28b(A)(2), first and second subparagraphs under the prior
SIXT H COUNCIL DIRECT IVE of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States
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The focus of these provisions is to mitigate costly registration requirements that
fall on the middleman’s shoulders in a triangular transaction. If we use the prior
example, this would mean that – under simplified rules (B), established in Germany,
would not need to register in the Member State of arrival of the goods (Austria), nor
would (B) need to account for acquisition VAT (in Austria). In addition, simplification
will relieve (B) from accounting for acquisition VAT in Germany under the “safety net”
provisions.
The simplification framework accomplishes its work by deeming (B’s) acquisition
of goods (dispatched by A from Italy) to have already been subject to VAT in Austria.21
But this is not all. Because (B) would still need to register for VAT in Austria to report
the onward sale to (C), this requirement is also removed. Under simplification all (B)
needs to do is to “designate” (C) as the party to report VAT under the reverse charge
mechanism.22
There is one caveat. Simplification does not extinguish (B’s) acquisition of the
goods; simplification simply deems (B’s) acquisition to have already been subject to
VAT. The distinction is important. The deeming structure leaves open (B’s) obligation
to file a recapitulative statement. In fact, Article 42(b) expressly conditions
simplification on (B) fulfillment of this requirement.23
OBSCURING MTIC WITH TRIANGULATION
MTIC fraudsters triangulate the movement of goods to hide their frauds from
authorities. Cross-border triangular structures can be difficult to analyze when there is a
single triangle, but when a fraudster chains together a number of triangles in a series of
back-to-back (or even overlapping) transactions, the truth of what happened can quickly
evaporate. The whole fabric of the trade becomes obscure without a considerable amount
of multi-jurisdictional cooperation in putting the pieces together.

relating to turnover tax – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (77/388/EEC)
1977 O.J. (L 145) 1.
19
VAT Directive, supra note 12, or Article 28b(B)(2), third sub-paragraph first and second indents under
the prior SIXT H COUNCIL DIRECT IVE , supra note 19.
20
VAT Directive, supra note 12, or Article 28c(E), point 3 at first through fifth indents under the prior
SIXT H COUNCIL DIRECT IVE , supra note 19.
21
Article 42 indicates (in part, emphasis added):
The first paragraph of Article 41 shall not apply and VAT shall be deemed to have been
applied to the intra-Community acquisition of goods in accordance with Article 40 …
22
Article 42(a) indicates (emphasis added in italics; references to the example added in [ ]s):
the person acquiring the goods [B] establishes that he has made the intra-Community
acquisition for the purposes of a subsequent supply [to C], within the territory of the
Member State identified [Austria] in accordance with Article 40, for which the person to
whom the supply is made [C] has been designated in accordance with Article 197 as
liable for payment of VAT;
23
Article 42(b) indicates (reference to the example added in [ ]s):
the person acquiring the goods [B] has satisfied the obligations laid down in Article 265 relating to
submission of the recapitulative statement.
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However, as a broader perspective on MTIC has taken hold, as more cases have
developed and moved through the court system, the law around triangulation and what
needs to be done to prevent MTIC has become clearer. The next four sections examine
these developments.
(1) Teleos plc and Others v. Commissioner of Customs and Excise. 24 Teleos is an
early MTIC triangulation case. It considers the fraud solely from the perspective of the
UK as Teleos plc is (A) in the ABC transaction. The facts date from 2003, and the
CJEU’s decision is rendered in 2007.
Teleos involves fourteen UK wholesale traders, each of whom sold large
quantities of mobile phones to the same foreign party, Total Telecom Espana SA/Ercosys
Mobile SA (TT). TT is VAT registered and resident of Malaga, Spain. Almost all of the
mobile phone contracts are “ex works.” The requirement is to place the phones with
Euro-Cellers Ltd., a UK freight forwarder operating a secure warehouse in London.
After doing this, Teleos and the others are contractually absolved from any delivery
requirements. Removal from the UK is entirely the responsibility of TT.
Teleos received notification that delivery had been completed in another Member
State when stamped and signed originals of the CMR consignment notes were returned
by post.25 The CMRs described the goods, stated the delivery address, the carrier’s name
and vehicle registration number. Signed by TT, these notes are the only objective
evidence available to Teleos that the mobile phones reached their destination. The CMRs
supported the taxpayer’s claim for zero-rating. The CMRs were presented to
representatives of HMRC, and HMRC deemed them to be sufficient.
The overall design of the Teleos transaction is triangular – (A) Teleos, in the UK
sells to (B) TT, in Spain who then re-sells to (C) an unspecified businesses, in France.
Delivery is allegedly direct from (A) to (C). In support of this design TT (B) files
Spanish returns. TT reports both the intra-community acquisitions from Teleos (A), and
onward intra-community supplies to French buyers (C) for each allotment of mobile
phones. With input VAT matching output VAT, TT reported no VAT due in Spain.
The Teleos triangles appear to have hidden a large MTIC carousel fraud.26
HMRC (Mr. Stone in particular) conducted a detailed investigation. Mr. Stone is
convinced that the mobile phones in this case never left the UK. He reports:

24

Case C-409/04 (September 27, 2007).
CMR consignment notes is a French acronym for, Convention relative au contrat de transport
international de marchandises par route which translates as “Convention on the Contract for the
International Carriage of Goods by Road,” signed at Geneva on May 19, 1956, as amended by the Protocol
of July 5, 1978.
26
If an investigator wanted to follow the goods in this case they might first look in Spain, but they would
later see that they were in France. However, if the fraud is a true carousel it is likely that the French buyer
turned around and re-sold these same phones to different buyers in the UK. This is in fact what Mr. Stone
found. If not for the errors in the Teleos/TT CMR documents it would be easy to conclude that the cell
phones in this case physically left the UK, and then actually returned on another transaction. T he fraudsters
25
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… the CMRs were false in two material particulars. The destination shown
in France was false. The vehicles identified by the registration number did
not exist or were not suitable for carrying mobile phones. Finally, the
transporter identified either did not transport the mobile phones or was not
engaged in the trade of transport.27
Mr. Stone’s further investigation revealed that instead of being delivered to
French buyers (per the CMRs and the Spanish tax returns) the Teleos mobile phones were
in fact re-sold to buyers within the UK.
Mr. Stone's investigations revealed that TT had on the same day purchased
the mobiles from … [(C) in France] and supplied them to one of three UK
VAT registered traders. Those traders had sold the mobile phones to five
other UK VAT registered traders who themselves had supplied them to
five different UK VAT registered traders. Those five traders had sold
them on, on the same day to six further UK VAT registered traders, which
paid TT for the phones.28
The Teleos’ Holding
Teleos is focused narrowly on the right to zero-rate an intra-community supply
when the only evidence that goods have crossed the frontier is the CMR note. Teleos is
complicated by two other factors (a) the fact that the tax authorities initially accepted the
CMR notes as adequate proof of the taxpayer’s qualification for exemption, even though
the notes later turn out to be fraudulent,29 and (b) the fact that the taxpayer neither knows
nor has the mean to know of the fraud. 30
Although not at the heart of the decision, triangulation directly factors in the
decision. Teleos argues that TT is a middleman (B) in a traditional triangulation. As
such, the returns filed by TT in Spain should be regarded as “conclusive proof” for the
purposes of the exemption from VAT of the intra-Community supply made by Teleos.
The court noted:
The order for reference states that there was evidence that TT had made
tax returns to the competent Spanish authorities relating to the intracould then say: “This is why Mr. Stone can find these same phones elsewhere in the UK after the Teleos
deal is concluded.”
27
Teleos and 13 Others v. Commissioners of HM Customs and Excise, [2004 EWHC 1035 (Admin.) May
6, 2004, at ¶128.
28
Teleos, at ¶108.
29
Teleos, supra note 24, at ¶ 16.
30
Teleos at ¶18 the CJEU indicated:
The national court considers it proven that there was no reason for Teleos an d Others to
doubt the information contained in the CMR consignment notes or their authenticity, and
that those companies were not party to any fraud and were unaware that the mobile
phones had not left the United Kingdom. It also concluded that, after Teleos and Others
had made serious and detailed inquiries as regards both TT and Euro -Cellars Ltd to
establish the legitimacy of the purchaser, they had no other real means of establishing the
falsity of the statements contained in those notes. Moreover, no additional evidence,
other than the CMR notes, could reasonably have been obtained, having regard to the
nature of the trade in question.
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Community acquisition of mobile telephones. TT had also declared the
onward supply of the goods as exempt intra-Community supplies and
claimed refunds of input VAT.31
The court turns this argument aside. The returns are objective evidence, but not
conclusive proof. The court indicates that the “… presentation by the purchaser of a tax
return relating to an intra-Community acquisition may be evidence of the actual transfer
of goods out of the Member State of supply, such a return does not however constitute
conclusive evidence for the purpose of proof of an exempt intra-Community supply of
goods.”32
Thus, in addition to the common encapsulation of the Teleos holding – that goods
must physically leave the territory of the Member State of supply to qualify for zerorating33 – Teleos also stands for the proposition that the zero-rating of (A’s) intracommunity supply cannot be “conclusively proven” by documenting that the middleman
(B) has reported the related intra-community acquisition (A) to (B) on its return, along
with an onward intra-community supply (B) to (C) of the same goods.
What’s Missing in Teleos?
There should have been more to the Teleos case. TT’s Spanish return is probably
wrong. Mr. Stone’s investigation in the UK should have supported a liability for Spanish
VAT under the safety net provisions of Article 41.
TT clearly considers itself to be a middleman (B) in a triangulation where Teleos
(A) is required to deliver cell phones directly to its customer (C) in France. TT does not
claim that it qualifies for triangulation simplification under Article 141. If it did then it
would not be filing Spanish returns that imposed and then deducted VAT. Article 41
therefore requires that TT should be accounting for “safety net” acquisition VAT.
Safety net acquisition VAT is not deductible (even though that is what TT did).
The Spanish VAT must be “reduced accordingly” as TT presents proof that French VAT
has been “applied in accordance with the first paragraph [of Article 41].” However,
French VAT was never imposed. The phones never left the UK (according to Mr. Stone).
But Teleos is even more complex. If pressed TT might produce evidence that
French acquisition VAT was imposed on the (B) to (C) transaction, but that it was
immediately deducted (offset by another set of transactions) where the phones were sold
on to another middleman (that Mr. Stone indicates is also TT). (C) would now be [A] in
the second triangulation of the same mobile phones. TT would once again be [B], and
the requirement would be for [A] to deliver the phones to various [Cs] in the UK.

31

Teleos, at ¶17.
Teleos, at ¶71.
33
See for example: Ben Terra & Julie Kajus, EUROPEAN VAT DIRECT IVES – INT RODUCTION TO EUROPEAN
VAT 2012, at 941-46.
32
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This is not a difficult task for [A]. The French buyer, (C) from the first triangle,
who is also [A] in the second triangle, has ownership of the phones in the Euro-Cellers
Ltd. warehouse in London where they have not departed. It is then, a simple matter for
the French buyer/seller to effect delivery in the UK (perhaps through an “ex works”
contract where the new UK buyers will show up and remove the phones). This is exactly
what Mr. Stone’s investigation uncovered.
What is most intriguing about Teleos is that even though the UK investigation
may not have lead to a UK liability (because HMRC had approved Teleos’ zero rate
based on the CMR documents) the same evidence would have produced a double VAT
assessment in another jurisdiction – Spain. As the middleman in two transactions dealing
with the same mobile phones, the “safety net” provisions of Article 41 should have
imposed non-deductable acquisition VAT on TT twice (pending proof that French VAT
was paid on the first triangulation, and UK VAT on the second).
(2) Mexcom Limited v. HMRC.34 This triangulation is based on facts developed
only one year after the transactions in Teleos arose. However, rather than mobile phones,
the goods at issue are rolls of toilet paper.
In Mexcom an Italian company (ORAN Spa) (A) supplies rolls of toilet paper to
(B) a UK company (Mexcom Ltd.). The toilet paper is re-sold by (B) and delivery is
required to be made directly by (A) to (C) in Spain. (C) is a British Virgin Islands
company (Amerix) with an alleged Spanish location (Mar de Luna SL).35
However, no evidence is offered that Amerix is a VAT registered taxpayer in
Spain (or any other EU jurisdiction). In addition, Mexcom does not file a recapitulative
statement (EC Sales List) in the UK, and as a result HMRC is never forewarned of
Mexcom’s onward sale to Amerix.36
Mexcom argues that triangulation simplification (Article 141) applies on its facts,
and as a result, it should be relieved of any obligation to remit acquisition VAT in the
UK. The “safety net” provisions of Article 41 should not apply. HMRC responds (and
the court agrees) that Mexcom has not met the conditions for applying simplification,
notably:
 It has not shown that Amerix (C) is identified for VAT purposes in Spain;
 It has not shown that Amerix (C) has been designated as liable for payment of
VAT on the domestic supply (that is taking place in Spain) by Mexcom;

34

[2010] UKFTT 163 (TC), April 13, 2010.
HMRC asked the Spanish VAT authorities for assistance at this point, and they reported that Mar de
Luna Invest SL was a registered VAT taxpayer, but declared no revenue for 2003-06, and was deregistered
in 2007. However the address of this firm was not the address on the CMRs. When that address was
visited the tax agents found a pub and prior to the pub there had been an agency that was unrelated to any
of the parties in the case. Mexcom Ltd., at ¶18.
36
At the appeal, Mexcom’s legal counsel indicated that the recapitulative statement (EC Sales List) was
filed in Italy (in error) where Mexcom is also registered for VAT. However, a copy of this filing was not
presented to HMRC or the court. Mexcom Ltd., at ¶¶11-14.
35
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Mexcom has not complied with its obligation to file the recapitulative statement
(EC Sales List) that Article 42(b) sets as a pre-condition to triangulation
simplification.

The outcome is inescapable. The safety net provisions of Article 41 apply to
Mexcom.37 Mexcom can only reduce the UK VAT that is due by demonstrating that
“VAT has been applied to that acquisition [by Amerix] in accordance with Article 40.”
This is an impossible task Mexcom. Amerix is not a registered taxpayer.
Mexcom’s Second Triangulation
Much like Teleos, where a detailed investigation by Mr. Stone revealed a second
(back-to-back) triangle immediately following the primary triangle, so too in Mexcom are
there back-to-back triangles. In Mexcom it is the taxpayer (not the government) that
outlines the second triangle for the court. Mexcom offers the second triangle as proof
that the UK has suffered “no loss of VAT overall,” because another party should have
collected UK VAT on the same rolls of toilet paper. 38
The taxpayer explains that the toilet paper that was shipped from Italy to Spain in
the first triangle (via Mexcom as a UK intermediary) was in fact returned to Italy (via a
different UK intermediary) in a second triangle. Amerix it turns out, has on-sold the
toilet paper to Comexco, another UK firm. Comexco in turn, has re-sold the toilet paper
to an unspecified Italian firm.
Comexco is the [B] in the second triangle. Comexco [B] required Amerix [A] to
deliver the toilet paper to an Italian buyer [C].39 Thus, much like the mobile phones in
Teleos, the toilet paper in Mexcom returns to the jurisdiction it came from, and one might
suspect that (in reality) it never left the local warehouse where it allegedly began its
journey in the first place.
If this is the case, then in Mexcom the jurisdiction where the real VAT loss was to
occur is Italy. There is no detail on this in the case, but one can imagine either that the
toilet paper was destined to be sold on the local (Italian) market without VAT, or that it
37

On January 26, 2011 the two VAT senates of the Bundesfinanzhof (German Supreme Tax Court) each
decided a case that reached the same conclusion (VR 39/08 and XI R 40/08). Both cases involve the sale o f
mobile phones between Italy and Austria. In each case the Austrian buyer uses his German VAT ID (rather
than his Austrian VAT ID) to secure a zero-rate on the sale out of Italy. Effectively, the buyer was
triangulating the sales into Austria (through Germany) in a manner that would obscure their movement.
However, Germany demanded VAT under the “safety net” provisions. In neither case could the taxpayer
demonstrate that the Austrian VAT was ever “accounted for,” and as a result the taxable amount could
never be “reduced accordingly.” German acquisition VAT was due, even though the mobile phones never
entered Germany. Italian VAT fraud was highly suspected in both cases. In both cases it was never clear
whether or not the mobile phones actually left Italy, or if they did whether they stayed in Austria and did
not return almost immediately to Italy. The strong suspicion in both of these cases is that the mobile
phones were sold on the Italian domestic market without VAT, or if VAT was collected then it was not
reported.
38
This argument functions similar to the argument the taxpayer made in Teleos – that the Spanish returns of
TT were “conclusive proof” that the safety net provisions in the UK were fully satisfied.
39
Mexcom Ltd., at ¶23.
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was to be sold with VAT, but with the tax not remitted.40 As in Teleos, it appears that the
fraudsters used back-to-back triangulations to slough off the VAT, and then disguise the
flow of goods from the tax authorities. Also, as in Teleos, there is most likely double
acquisition VAT due on the two sales of toilet paper through UK intermediaries –
Mexcom (B) in the first triangle and Comexco [B] in the second triangle. 41
Mexcom is a classic example of a case (like Teleos) where a cooperative, multiMember State audit would have assisted a number of jurisdictions to counter MTIC fraud
within their borders. The Italian tax authority was “missing in action” in Mexcom (as
were the Spanish and French tax authorities in Teleos).
(3) The Joined cases of Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. X and Facet BV.42 X
and Facet are Dutch companies that conduct business as intermediaries in the EU
computer and computer accessories market. In both cases the Inspecteur van de
Belastingdienst determines that acquisition VAT is due under the “safety net” provision
of Article 41.
Facts of X. X purchases computers and computer accessories from various EU
suppliers (none of whom are located in the Netherlands or Spain) and sells them to
customers in Spain. The invoices to X do not include VAT. They reference X’s
Netherlands VAT ID number.43 The invoice X issues to its customers reference the
triangulation simplification rules of Article 141. However X is not able to establish that
the goods are dispatched or transported directly to the customers in Spain, (A) to (C).44
X takes two different filing positions during the eighteen-month period under
audit. From January 1, through September 30, 1998 X does not include VAT due from
intra-community acquisitions nor does it deduct VAT with respect to these acquisitions.
In addition, X files no recapitulative statements (EC Sales Lists) with respect to these
transactions (Article 262).45
For the next period, October 1, 1998 through June 30, 1999 X does just the
opposite. This time X includes VAT due from its intra-community acquisitions, and then
deducts the same VAT. In addition, X files recapitulative statements with respect to
these transactions.46
40

See the discussion of the German cases VR 39/08 and XI R 40/08 supra, note 37.
It is interesting to recall the House of Lords warning. Mexcom is a case that precisely fits the prediction
that:
There is no need for the goods to come to the UK. [T]he UK simply handles the
paperwork (invoices) and the payments.
Mexcom is also an example of how the UK is used as a staging area for fraud carried out elsewhere in the
EU. Mexcom is one of a number of UK companies owned by a Frenchman, M. Luc Sommeyre, who did
not appear in court, but who lives in Thailand and has a small staff in Singapore and Monte Carlo where he
is “engaged in buying and selling goods across international borders.” Mexcom Ltd., at ¶13.
42
Joined cases C-536/08 and C-539/08 (April 22, 2010).
43
X and Facet BV at ¶15.
44
X and Facet BV at ¶17.
45
X and Facet BV at ¶16.
46
X and Facet BV at ¶17.
41
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Facts of Facet BV. Facet is also established in the Netherlands. It purchases
computer parts from Germany and Italy and sells them to customers in Cyprus. Most
customers have a tax representative in Greece. The computer parts are transferred
directly from Germany or Italy to Spain. 47
Mentioning Facet’s Netherlands VAT ID the suppliers do not include VAT on
invoices to Facet. In addition, Facet does not include VAT on invoices to the Cypriot
customers. Facet mentions the Greek VAT ID of the representative. On its tax return
Facet includes the VAT due on its intra-community acquisitions and deducts the same
amount. It also mentions the transactions on its recapitulative statements. 48 On its Dutch
return Facet claimed simplified triangulation (Article 141), but failed to mention this on
the invoices they issued.49
Neither the Cypriot customers, nor their Greek representatives file intracommunity acquisitions. In addition they do not provide notification of further intracommunity supplies, or recapitulative statements with respect to the supplies from Facet.
Further, these customers are not registered for VAT purposes in Spain, and do not file
intra-community acquisitions in Spain.50
Although both X and Facet involve simplification triangulations, it is Facet that
reveals most about how fraudsters exploit this mechanism. X may have filed inaccurate
returns because it misunderstood requirements. Facet however is a different story. Facet
initially made a good faith effort to file properly, but demands from the Cyprus buyers
that came in later stretched the (ABC) triangle into a fourth Member State (ABCD). This
forced the collapse of Facet’s filing position.
Incomplete & Collapsed Simplification
Both X and Facet file simplification triangulations with the Dutch authorities.
Both indicate that they are in the (B) position of an ABC transaction. Regardless of the
transaction to which the transportation is ascribed, simplification would allow X or Facet
to:
(a) receive zero-rated supplies (intra-Community acquisitions) from their
suppliers;

47

X and Facet BV at ¶21.
X and Facet BV at ¶23.
49
The CJEU seems to suggest that Facet should have done was to use Spanish VAT numbers of the Cypriot
companies (although at the time Spain would not allow companies not established in Spain to register) or in
the alternative, Facet itself should file itself for an intra-community acquisition in Spain, (but Facet would
face the same registration prohibition in Spain). The CJEU suggests that Facet would then sell-on to the
Cypriot customers, who would eventually enter into transaction with the Spanish end -customer. A similar
problem is considered by Peter Hughes, EU VAT Aspects of Longer Chains of Triangular Transactions, 23
INT . VAT M ONIT OR, 2012 (published on line July 9, 2012) at ¶5. Hughes’ solution is for the party in
Facet’s position to register in Germany and Italy thereby making the first transaction a domestic sale and
the remainder an acceptable triangular transaction.
50
X and Facet BV at ¶23.
48
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(b) be absolved from accounting for VAT in the Netherlands on the intraCommunity acquisitions;
(c) be absolved from accounting for VAT in Spain or Cyprus on their subsequent
intra-Community supplies; and
(d) be absolved from registering and charging VAT to their customers in Spain or
Cyprus.
X’s incomplete filing. X appears unsure about the rules for simplified
triangulation. X files in two different ways, neither of which fulfills the requirements of
Article 141. If we ascribe naive innocence to X (it could be otherwise), then X is a
middleman so anxious to make a sale (and reduce costs) that he agrees to have (C) in
Spain transport the computer parts, and never secures the proof he needs under Article
141(c) to support simplification. X is pushed into Article 41’s safety net – it must report
acquisition VAT, register in Spain, collect Spanish VAT, and only then can it reduce the
Dutch taxable amount as the Spanish VAT is applied.
There is nothing in the CJEU decision, or in the Gerechtshof’s-Gravenhage
(Appeals Court) decision to suggest that the buyers in Spain (C) were “missing traders,”
or that X knew or should have known that its customers were fraudsters. However, this is
precisely how a “missing trader” would take advantage of an anxious middleman. It is
the reason for the safety net (Article 41), and the reason that simplification requires
middlemen to have proof of direct (A) to (C) transport.
Then again, if X is not naïve, and is aware of a possible fraud, then filing “as if”
simplified triangulation applies (without a recapitulative statement) functions to hide the
fraud.
acet’s collapsed simplification. Facet also files as (B) in an ABC simplification.
Facet regularly buys from German and Italian suppliers (A), and occasionally takes
delivery in the Netherlands. In this instance however buyers from Cyprus (some of
whom have tax representatives in Greece) step forward (C). Facet expects that computer
parts will be shipped directly from (A) in Germany or Italy to (C) in Cyprus.
The buyers in Cyprus however also have an ABC simplification in mind. They
request that Facet ship instead to its customers in Spain (D). Rather than take delivery in
the Netherlands and then re-ship to Spain, Facet instead instructs the German and Italian
sellers to ship directly to Spain. The ABC transaction becomes ABCD.
To compound difficulties neither the Cypriot businesses nor their Greek tax
representative:
… filled out declarations of intra-Community acquisitions … Nor was any
notification given of intra-Community supplies or any recapitulative
statement … submitted. Furthermore, the customers were not registered in
Spain for VAT purposes and did not fill out any declarations of intraCommunity acquisitions in that country. 51
51

X and Facet BV, at ¶23.
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This description distinguishes Facet from X. These facts suggest that the
Cypriot/Greeks traders are acting like fraudsters – people who plan on becoming
“missing traders.” They may have even set-up Facet for this fraud.
In Facet two sets of triangles overlap. The Cypriot/Greek business is both (C) in
the first triangle and [B] in the second. In this respect Facet resembles both Teleos and
Mexcom where a similar overlapping occurred.52 This pattern of overlapping triangles is
suggestive of missing trader fraud. The plan in Facet seems to be for the Cypriot/Greek
buyers to disappear after the computer parts are delivered to unknown parties in Spain
without VAT.
The difference between Teleos and Facet is the Dutch insistence that Facet, like
X, should remit acquisition VAT in the Netherlands under Article 41’s “safety net” until
such time as the Spanish VAT is paid. No similar demand was made of TT in Teleos, but
in Mexcom the UK tax authority did make this demand.
(4 Mecse - a ona ft . Nem eti Ad - s mhi atal l-dun nt li Region lis
Ad
iga gat s ga.53 Mecsek-Gabona represents the most recent twist in missing
trader/ triangulation simplification enforcement. Mecsek-Gabona replicates the Teleos
fact patterns, but with a far harsher outcome.
Like Teleos, Mecsek-Gabona is concerned with (A) in an ABC transaction.
Unlike Teleos however, Mecsek-Gabona allows the tax authority to deny (A’s) zero-rate
on the first leg of the ABC transaction if it is determined that (A) knew or should have
known that by its sale to (B) that it was a participant in fraud. Incidentally, MecsekGabona applies equally to deny (A’s) zero-rate if it is demonstrated that (A), in a case
where (A) was making the delivery to (C), knew or should have known that this delivery
was part of a fraud.
Mecsek-Gabona is a Hungarian company engaged in the wholesale supply of
cereals, tobacco, seeds and fodder. In August 2009 Mecsek-Gabona sells 1,000 tons of

52

In Teleos the French end-buyers in the first triangle (C) turned around and became the first-sellers in the
second triangle (A). The dual triangulation served to obscure the audit trail and formally get the mobile
phones in the case back into the UK (where they had physically never left the warehouse that Teleos had
placed them). In Mexcom it was the unregistered Amerix that served as both the end-buyer in the first
triangle (C) and the first-seller in the second triangle (A). Once again the dual triangles were set up to
obscure the fact that the toilet paper that was the subject of this fraud had never left the Italian warehouses.
In Facet the dual triangle pattern is condensed. The Cypriot/Greek buyers have placed themselves as end buyer in the first triangle (C), but also the middleman (B) in the second triangle. Facet ma y be an innocent
party that was too anxious to make a sale. It may have been tricked into being both the middleman (B) in
the first triangle and the first-seller in the second triangle (A). If so, then Facet will pay dearly for its lack
of attention to detail. It owes VAT in the Netherlands under that safety net provision of Article 41, because
the first triangle it was involved in does not qualify as a simplification. Facet will only be able to “reduce
this tax accordingly” as the end-buyers in Spain are found and required to pay acquisition VAT.
53
Case C-273/11 (September 6, 2012).
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rapeseed to an Italian trader in agricultural products (Agro-Trade).54 As in Teleos, the
contract is “ex-works.” Agro-Trade is obligated to remove the rapeseed from the
Mecsek-Gabona premises.
Like TT in Teleos, Agro-Trade is a middleman (B). Argo-Trade re-sells the
rapeseed to unspecified buyers (C) in other Member States.55 These trades do not appear
in Italian tax records.56 The reason for this omission (which is not detailed in the case)
appears to be that Argo-Trade has adopted the same reporting position with respect to
triangulation simplifications that X adopted (during the first nine months of its audit). X
believed that in a triangulation simplification it did not need to include in its domestic
returns the VAT due from intra-community acquisitions nor did it need to deduct VAT.
In addition X believed that no recapitulative statement with respect to these transactions
was needed under Article 262, as the entire transaction is a wash.57 If Argo-Trade agreed
with X’s filing position there would be no VAT to report in Italy on its asserted
simplification triangulations.
As in Teleos, Mecsek-Gabona received signed CMRs in the mail soon after
delivery, and as in Teleos the CMRs are questioned for completeness and accuracy. In
addition, Mecsek-Gabona issues two invoices to Argo-Trade, one for HUF 34,638,175,
and the other for HUF 34,555,235.58 Only the first is paid. The second (which was to be
settled within eight months) remained unpaid at the time of trial three years later.
Kittel and Mecsek-Gabona
Mecsek-Gabona adopts the same “known or should have known” standard for
determining a connection with fraud that was advanced in the Joined cases of Kittel v.
Belgium and Belgium v. Recolta Recycling SPRL (Kittel).59 In Kittel it is the right of
deduction that is denied based on a purchaser’s knowledge that his supply chain is
tainted. If a buyer knows or should know that a contemplated purchase is connected with
fraud, then that buyer’s right to deduct VAT on these purchases can be denied. 60
Mecsek-Gabona applies ittel’s reasoning to sales. It holds that the right to zerorate an intra-Community supply can be denied if it is determined that the seller knew or
should have known that the sale was connected with fraud in the customer chain. The
CJEU listed a number of factors that might indicate that Mecsek-Gabona had the
54

Mecsek-Gabona, at ¶¶14-15 & 20 Argo-Trade had a valid VAT ID at the time of the contract (August
2009), although on January 14, 2010 it was removed from the register with retroactive effect from April 17,
2009.
55
Mecsek-Gabona, at ¶16.
56
Mecsek-Gabona, at ¶20 (indicating that Argo-Trade never paid Italian VAT).
57
Text at supra note 45.
58
Approximately $157,886.06 and $157,481.32.
59
ECJ judgment of 6 July 2006, Joined Cases C-439/04 and C-440/04 [2006] ECR 1-6161.
60
Mecsek-Gabona and Kittel are linked indirectly. At ¶47 of the Mecsek-Gabona decision the Kittel
standard is explored, but the citations therein are not to Kittel, but rather to ¶41 in another recent Hungarian
decision which also discusses the known/should have known principle. (Mahagében kft v. Nemzeti Adó-és
Vámhivatal Dél-dunántúli Regionális Adó Fölgazgatósága and Péter Dávid v. Nemzeti Adó-és Vámhivatal
Dél-dunántúli Regionális Adó Fölgazgatósága, C-80/11 and C-142/11). It is Mahagében/Dávid in turn that
expressly references Kittel.
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requisite knowledge of fraud (although a final determination of knowledge is left up to
the national courts):
… in its written and oral submissions before the Court, the Hungarian
Government claims that several factors not mentioned in the order for
reference prove, in its opinion, that Mecsek-Gabona acted in bad faith. To
that effect, the Hungarian Government argues that, even though MecsekGabona was not familiar with the purchaser of the goods at issue in the
main proceedings, it had not requested any guarantees from the purchaser;
it did not check the purchaser’s VAT identification number until after the
transaction; it did not collect any additional information on the purchaser;
it had transferred the right to dispose of the goods as owner to the
purchaser, while accepting that payment of the original sale price could be
deferred; and it had presented the CMRs returned by the purchaser even
though they were incomplete.61
As a result, more severe arguments could have been raised in both Facet and X.
The Dutch government only asserted that the “safety net” of Article 41 required that these
companies account for acquisition VAT in the Netherlands. This accounting might be
temporary in both cases (as the tax might be reduced accordingly) if the Spanish buyer
was identified and he accounted for VAT.
However, under Mecsek-Gabona it is the zero-rate that both Facet and X applied
on their onward sales that can be denied. The denial would be absolute (without the
possibility of relief), if the tax authority could demonstrate that Facet or X knew or
should have known that their buyers were engage in fraud. Facet would appear to be
more vulnerable than X because of the unusual shift in delivery instructions from the
Cyprus/Greek buyer to a non-registered buyer in a fourth Member State (although these
instructions could have been to simply deposit the computer parts at a designated
warehouse).
The same outcome could be replicated in Mexcom. Rather than simply enforce
the safety net provisions (Article 41), HMRC could argue that the zero-rate on Mexcom’s
sale to Amerix should be denied.
HMRC would only need to argue that Mexcom should have known that there was
a fraud possible by setting itself up as a middleman (B) between an Italian firm (A) and
Amerix (C), a British Virgin Islands company alleged to have a Spanish business
location, but without a Spanish VAT registration (or a registration in any other EU
jurisdiction). The status of Amerix is something that could have been determined with
even the most cursory due diligence inquiry. This suggests that Mexcom had reason to
believe that its intra-Community sale was connected with fraud.
HMRC’s argument could be further buttressing by showing that Mexcom and
Comexco were related parties. From this larger perspective it is reasonably easy to

61

Mecsek-Gabona, at ¶52.
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determine that this is a toilet paper carousel fraud that is controlled by Mexcom’s and
Comexco’s simplified triangulations – all pivoting on the Amerix enterprise.
CONCLUSION
Fraudsters have found that simplified triangulations under Article 141 disguises
the flow of goods involved in MTIC frauds. They have also found that when multiple
and overlapping triangles are used, then the movement of goods becomes even more
obscure. As a result, as enforcement becomes more cooperative among the member
States there has been a heightened focus on triangular structures.
Case law is moving forward. New tools are being crafted for cross-border
enforcement at every turn, and the Member States are becoming more inclination to use
these tools, even when the immediate beneficiary is the fisc of a neighboring jurisdiction,
not their own. These enforcement actions are creating problems for businesses that take a
casual approach to triangular trade.
There is a considerable difference in the cooperative enforcement in Teleos, and
the information sharing in Mecsek-Gabona.62 In Mecsek-Gabona the Hungarian tax
authority submitted a request for information to the Italian tax authority under Article
5(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1798/2003 of 7 October 2003 on administrative
cooperation in the field of VAT and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 218/92.63 From this
request it learned that:
 Argo-Trade could not be found;
 The address used as Argo-Trade’s registered office was a private home;
 No company named Argo-Trade had ever been registered at that address;
 Argo-Trade had never paid VAT; and
 Argo-Trade was otherwise unknown to the Italian tax authority.
This kind of information sharing and cooperative enforcement is mild in
comparison to what is coming next – Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010
concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties, and
other measures (MARC).64 The new MARC, a central component of the Commission’s
short term action plan was set out in a January 12, 2008 Communication.65 It is designed
to keep pace with the rising tied of MTIC requests. It became effective January 1, 2012.

62

HMRC asked for information from the Spanish tax authorities in Mexcom Ltd. and learned through this
means that there were irregularities in the business address of Amerix in Spain, as well as the fact that
Amerix was not registered for VAT in Spain. See supra note 35.
63
O.J. (L 264) 1 (2003).
64
O.J. (L 84) 1 (2010).
65
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic
and Social Committee, On a coordinated strategy to improve the fight against VAT Fraud in the European
Union, COM(2008) 807. The long term action plan contained in the same document presented measures
that in “… ensuing discussions in the Council … [were] regarded as more radical and could not be
introduced in the short run.” EU Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on administrative
cooperation and combating fraud in the field of value added tax (Recast) , COM (2009) 427 (August 18,
2009) at 2. Other elements of the short term action plan included (listed at page 13): timeframe reductions,

19
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2186474

Simplification triangulation
14 January 2013
Richard T. Ainsworth

In 2003 there were 3,355 MARC requests. By 2007 these requests had
quadrupled to 11,794. By 2007 VAT claims related to MTIC fraud accounted for 57.5%
of all MARC requests. Facilitating cross-border MTIC enforcement is the heart of the
new MARC.
The sweep of the new MARC is broad, and mandatory. The requested tax
authority “… shall provide any information which is foreseeably relevant to the applicant
authority in the recovery of its claims.”66 The requested tax authority must comply, and
cannot decline to supply information “… solely because this information is held by a
bank, other financial institution, nominee, or person acting in an agency or a fiduciary
capacity.”67
There are three main parts to MARC: rules on exchange of information;
standardization of notification documentation; mechanisms for assistance in the recovery
of claims, and precautionary measures. Considerable effort has gone into making
instruments uniform and encouraging uniform practices. 68
With the new MARC in place, and very helpful decisions of the CJEU dealing
with simplified triangulation and the “safety net” (X and Facet), as well as the ability to
deny a claimed zero-rate in an intra-Community supply (Mecsek-Gabona) based on
Kittel-type tests of knowledge of fraud (known or should have known), it is very likely
that we are at the beginnings of a new round of MTIC enforcement actions.
Triangulation will be at the center of the perfect storm.69 The Augsburg
investigation of hundreds of triangulated sales of goods and services throughout the EU,
involving most of the 27 Member States, is just the beginning.70

joint and several liability extensions, import VAT exemptions, a revision of VIES, shared responsibility for
all Member State revenue, EUROFISC, and uniform chargeability on all intra-Community transactions.
66
O.J. (L 84) 1 (2010) at Art. 5(1) (emphasis added).
67
O.J. (L 84) 1 (2010) at Art. 5(3).
68
Instruments permitting enforcement or precautionary measures, the notification documents related to
these measures, and the translation of documents.
69
See: A Perfect Storm, supra note 3.
70
Supra note 8, and accompanying text.
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